US requires licenses for advanced AI chips to Brazil and four Asian countries, and curbs China’s remote access to chips

The US Commerce Department issued a rule on Monday requiring licenses for advanced AI chips shipped to Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and for data centers giving China-linked companies large computing power. BIS says Treasury and the National Security Council directed the rule, which takes effect Thursday The United States will require licenses for the export of advanced semiconductors to Brazil, while maintaining stricter restrictions on China, under new rules aimed at limiting access by countries considered at risk to American technologies. The measure is contained in a regulation published today by the U.S. Department of Commerce, which establishes new requirements for the export, reexport, and transfer of advanced computing equipment, including semiconductors used in the development of artificial intelligence models. In the Brazilian case, the country was included on a list of five destinations that will now require prior authorization to receive certain semiconductors and advanced computing equipment subject to U.S. controls. In addition to Brazil, the list includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, countries that, according to the Department of Commerce, present a higher-than-usual risk of technology diversion. Read more about this topic: US defends more balanced trade relationship with China ahead of Trump-Xi meeting “These countries are being included in response to concerns that advanced computing equipment, subject to the licensing requirements of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), is being diverted, without authorization, to entities and countries of concern,” the document states. As a result, license applications for exports destined for these five countries will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account whether the operations pose risks to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. The assessment will also consider the effectiveness of national export control systems and each country’s cooperation with the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) in enforcing the restrictions. The regulation provides, however, an exception for operations destined for companies headquartered in the U.S. or whose parent companies are headquartered in that country, provided specific reporting obligations to U.S. authorities are met. Read more about this topic: Trump on chip controls and China: “Two different views,” and “I’ll make a decision,” as Bessent and Lutnick clash over Megaspeed The rule stipulates that exporting companies will have to submit monthly reports containing information on the parties involved in the transactions, the end users, the products traded, and their respective technical characteristics. Regarding China, the rules maintain a considerably more restrictive regime, with authorization requests for most exports of certain advanced equipment subject to a “presumption of denial.” The document provides for the possibility of case-by-case review for some lower-capacity semiconductors intended for end users in China or Macau, provided they meet specific technical thresholds and additional information is supplied to authorities. The U.S. restrictions also seek to prevent Chinese companies from circumventing controls through data centers installed in other countries, or through remote access to processing capacity of equipment manufactured with U.S. technology. Read more about this topic: Beijing says “no evidence,” Washington says an intelligence effort, and Nvidia’s board says no secrets were compromised (with video) In this regard, the regulation establishes the need for licenses for certain operations involving data centers that provide large volumes of computing capacity to companies headquartered in China, Macau, or other territories subject to specific U.S. restrictions. The rule further stipulates that data center operators and foreign manufacturers must strengthen customer verification, including identifying any direct or indirect ownership stakes or control relationships by companies from the covered territories. According to the Department of Commerce, access to this computing capacity can support military and intelligence activities, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons, cyber espionage, targeted sabotage, algorithm theft, and disinformation. “Access to this computing capacity can be used to train and run advanced superintelligence models capable of supporting military and intelligence activities that may threaten the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States,” it emphasizes.