Opinion: Alice Huang would have been the optimal choice for a honeytrap operation

Open this photo in gallery: Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang embraces Chinese businesswoman Alice Huang after delivering his keynote speech at COMPUTEX 2024 in Taipei, Taiwan, June 2, 2024. Ann Wang/Reuters W.M. Kroboth is a 25-year CSIS veteran who is a business intelligence and entertainment industry consultant. Spy agencies live in a world of probabilities, not certainties. The apparent honeytrap operation that allegedly targeted now-former Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang is a case in point. Being reactive instead of proactive is not an option for intelligence services. They collect information, draw inferences, and provide a percentage probability related to an emerging threat and then – usually – it or one of its government clients (e.g., the U.S. Department of Commerce) decides what steps should be taken to disrupt that threat before it becomes more serious. In the Jensen Huang matter, it’s apparent that the U.S. government did not take meaningful action on intelligence reports from more than a year ago that said Mr. Huang was the target of a sophisticated honeytrap operation orchestrated by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), China’s civilian foreign intelligence service, and that it seems to have been allowed to run much longer than it should have. (Beijing has denied that Alice Huang, a former tech executive with no relation to Mr. Huang, was a spy.) Some critics of this assessment have opined that the alleged femme fatale of the story could not have been a spy because she was extremely active on social media, including posting pictures of her and Mr. Huang together. That’s an incorrect assumption. It’s a common misconception that covert operatives must always lurk in the shadows and never be seen. Absolutes like this don’t exist. Spy agencies focus on what makes the most sense in a given operation. At Nvidia, a strongman leader who did as he liked. Seen this before? Every case is unique. Hiding in plain sight can be the optimal tactic. The key word here is “optimal,” not perfect. Perfection is a rare species in the grey, murky, dense espionage jungle. Megaspeed, the Singapore-based cloud computing and AI infrastructure company where Ms. Huang was a director, appears to have been little more than a shell corporation to contravene U.S. export laws to smuggle the most advanced Nvidia chips into China. According to the New York Times, Megaspeed’s corporate headquarters in Singapore had a sparse, minimal footprint. Based on the available intelligence, Megaspeed should have been placed on the U.S. Entity List (a blacklist) long ago. Instead, Mr. Huang admitted to an affair with Ms. Huang when she was working at Megaspeed. Her background as a tech executive could have allowed Ms. Huang to slowly, methodically enter Mr. Huang’s world in a natural, non-alerting manner. Honeytraps generally try to put themselves in the target’s line of sight multiple times to be approached, because whenever possible, an intelligence service wants the target to initiate first contact, as it gives the target a false sense of being in control. Another common misconception is that honeytrap operations are just about sex. A sophisticated honeytrap operative would also offer an intellectual and emotional connection, and feed the target’s ego. Someone relatively age-appropriate such as Ms. Huang, who is in her 40s, would have been far more believable as a partner for Mr. Huang than a younger female operative. Understandably, the focus of most of the news coverage has been about the potential impact on U.S. national security. Nvidia’s most advanced AI chips may have ended up in the hands of the Chinese government, specifically its military. Opinion: Nvidia had no succession plan. Did the board consider Jensen Huang an immortal god? What’s getting less coverage is what Ms. Huang – who has not been seen or heard from since the story broke – and Mr. Huang would have talked about during their affair. Mr. Huang has close connections with many powerful U.S. politicians and Silicon Valley executives, and has likely heard their candid, private opinions on myriad issues. He may also be aware of their vulnerabilities. If Ms. Huang was indeed a spy, this information could be exploited by foreign intelligence agencies in future operations. Mr. Huang says Nvidia’s dealings with Megaspeed were “completely normal and not unusual,” and the company said it found no evidence of chip diversion. But a CEO running a multitrillion-dollar company definitely has the resources and responsibility to conduct further due diligence on a customer making multibillion-dollar purchases of restricted technology. It does not appear as if that was done or, if it was, willful blindness ensued. Questions that still need to be answered include: Why was Megaspeed not placed on the U.S. Entity List? Why wasn’t Mr. Huang given a formal defensive briefing? How much stock do senior U.S. administration officials own in Nvidia, and did their financial interest impact any of their decisions? There are many more layers yet to this onion. Certainty is also a rare species in the espionage jungle. But despite Beijing’s vehement denials, and with more information to come, the balance of probabilities makes this look like an extremely successful honeytrap operation.